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Abstract
We analyze the causal-observational languages that were introduced in Barbero and
Sandu (2018), which allow discussing interventionist counterfactuals and functional
dependencies in a unified framework. In particular, we systematically investigate
the expressive power of these languages in causal team semantics, and we provide
complete natural deduction calculi for each language. As an intermediate step towards
the completeness, we axiomatize the languages over a generalized version of causal
team semantics, which turns out to be interesting also in its own right.
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1 Introduction
Counterfactual conditionals express the modality of irreality : they describe
what would or might be the case in circumstances which diverge from the actual
state of affairs. Pinning down the exact meaning and logic of counterfactual
statements has been the subject of a large literature (see e.g. [15]). We are
interested here in a special case: the interventionist counterfactuals, which
emerged from the literature on causal inference ([14,13,11]). Under this reading,
a conditional X = x ψ states that ψ would hold if we were to intervene on the
given system, by subtracting the variables X to their current causal mechanisms
and forcing them to take the values x.
The logic of interventionist counterfactuals has been mainly studied in the
semantical context of deterministic causal models ([7,8,3,19]), which consist
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of an assignment of values to variables together with a system of structural
equations that describe the causal connections. In [1], causal models were gen-
eralized to causal teams, in the spirit of team semantics ([12,16]), by allowing
a set of assignments (a “team”) instead of a single assignment. This opens the
possibility of describing e.g. uncertainty, observations, and dependencies.
One of the main reasons for introducing causal teams was the possibility
of comparing the logic of dependencies of causal nature (those definable in
terms of interventionist counterfactuals) against that of contingent dependen-
cies (such as those studied in the literature on team semantics, or in database
theory) in a unified semantic framework. [1,2] give anecdotal evidence of the
interactions between the two kinds of dependence, but offer no general axioma-
tizations for languages that also involve contingent dependencies. In this paper
we fill this gap in the literature by providing complete deduction systems (in
natural deduction style) for the languages COD and CO\\/ (from [1]), which
enrich the basic counterfactual language CO, respectively, with atoms of func-
tional dependence =(X;Y) (“Y is functionally determined by X”), or with the
intuitionistic disjunction \\/ , in terms of which functional dependence is defin-
able. We also give semantical characterizations, for COD, CO\\/ and the basic
counterfactual language CO, in terms of definability of classes of causal teams.
The strategy of the completeness proofs is the following. We introduce
a generalized causal team semantics, which encodes uncertainty over causal
models, not only over assignments. (This semantics is used as a tool towards
completeness, but also has independent interest.) We then prove completeness
results for this semantics, by incorporating techniques developed in [17,5] for
the pure (non-causal) team context. Finally, we extend the calculi to complete-
ness over causal teams by adding axioms which capture the property of being
a causal team (i.e. encoding certainty about the causal connections).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal lan-
guages and two kinds of semantics. Section 3 deepens the discussion of the
functions which describe causal mechanisms, addressing issues of definability
and the treatment of dummy arguments. Section 4 characterizes semantically
the language CO and reformulates in natural deduction form the CO calculi
that come from [2]. Section 5 gives semantical characterizations for COD and
CO\\/, and complete natural deduction calculi for both kinds of semantics.
2 Syntax and semantics
2.1 Formal languages
Let us start by fixing the syntax. Each of the languages considered in this paper
is parametrized by a (finite) signature σ, i.e. a pair (Dom,Ran), where Dom
is a nonempty finite set of variables, and Ran is a function that associates to
each variable X ∈ Dom a nonempty finite set Ran(X) (called the range of X) of
constant symbols or values. 3 We reserve the Greek letter σ for signatures.
3 Note that we do not encode a distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables
into the signatures, as done in [8]. Instead, we follow the style of Briggs [3]. Doing so will
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We use a boldface capital letter X to stand for a sequence 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉 of vari-
ables; similarly a boldface lower case letter x stands for a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
of values. We will sometimes abuse notation and treat X and x as sets. We
write Ran(X) = Ran(X1) × · · · × Ran(Xn).
Now fix a signature σ = (Dom,Ran). An atomic σ-formula is an equation
X = x, where X ∈ Dom and x ∈ Ran(X). The conjunction of n equations
(. . . ((X1 = x1 ∧ X2 = x2) ∧ X3 = x3) ∧ · · · ∧ Xn−1 = xn−1) ∧ Xn = xn is abbreviated
as X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn = xn or further as X = x, and is also called an equation.
Compound formulas of the basic language CO[σ] are formed by the grammar:
α ::= X = x | ¬α | α ∧ α | α ∨ α | X = x α
where X ∪ {X} ⊆ Dom, x ∈ Ran(X), x ∈ Ran(X). The connective  is used to
form interventionist counterfactuals. We abbreviate ¬(X = x) as X , x, and
X = x ∧ X , x as ⊥. Throughout the paper, we reserve the first letters of the
Greek alphabet, α, β, . . . for CO[σ]-formulas.
Let us compare our language CO[σ] with the existing interventionist coun-
terfactual languages in the literature. The original formulation of CO[σ] in
[1,2] includes in the syntax another conditional ⊃, called selective implication,
which can be defined in our setting in terms of negation and disjunction as
α ⊃ β := ¬α ∨ β. Our primitive connective negation ¬ was treated in [1,2] as a
defined connective. The language CO[σ] as defined here can also be seen as the
fragment of the language considered by Briggs in [3] in which occurrences of ∨
and ¬ are not allowed in the antecedents of . Differently from the language
for counterfactuals defined by Halpern in [9], in our language CO[σ] nesting of
counterfactuals to the right of  is allowed (i.e., in X = x  α, α can still
contain counterfactuals), and any type of variables (exogenous or endogenous)
can occur in the antecedents of counterfactuals (i.e., in X = x) as we do not
distinguish exogenous and endogenous variables in the signature σ.
We study in this paper also two extensions of CO[σ], obtained by adding
the intuitionistic disjunction \\/ , or the dependence atoms =(X;Y):
• CO\\/[σ] : ϕ ::= X = x | ¬α | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ \\/ϕ | X = x ϕ
• COD[σ] : ϕ ::= X = x | =(X;Y) | ¬α | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X = x ϕ
Note that we only allow the negation ¬ to occur in front of CO[σ]-formulas.
2.2 Causal teams
We now define the team semantics of our logics over causal teams. We first
recall the definition of causal teams adapted from [2].
Fix a signature σ = (Dom,Ran). An assignment over σ is a mapping
s : Dom→ ⋃X∈Dom Ran(X) such that s(X) ∈ Ran(X) for each X ∈ Dom. 4 Denote
by Aσ the set of all assignments over σ. A team T over σ is a set of assignments
result in more general completeness results.
4 We identify syntactical variables and values with their semantical counterpart, following
the conventions in most literature on interventionist counterfactuals, e.g. [7,8,3,19]. In this
convention distinct symbols (e.g., x, x′) denote distinct objects.
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over σ, i.e., T ⊆ Aσ.
A system of functions F over σ is a function that assigns to each variable
V in a domain En(F ) ⊆ Dom a set PAFV ⊆ Dom \ {V} of parents of V, and a
function FV : Ran(PAFV ) → Ran(V). 5 Variables in the set En(F ) are called
endogenous variables of F , and variables in Ex(F ) = Dom \En(F ) are called
exogenous variables of F .
Denote by Fσ the set of all systems of functions over σ, which is clearly
finite. We say that an assignment s ∈ Aσ is compatible with a system of
functions F ∈ Fσ if for all endogenous variables V ∈ En(F ), s(V) = FV (s(PAFV )).
Definition 2.1 A causal team over a signature σ is a pair T = (T−,F )
consisting of
• a team T− over σ, called the team component of T ,
• and a system of functions F over σ, called the function component of T ,
where all assignments s ∈ T− are compatible with the function component F .
Any system F ∈ Fσ of functions can be naturally associated with a (di-
rected) graph GF = (Dom, EF ), defined as (X,Y) ∈ EF iff X ∈ PAFY . We say thatF is recursive if GF is acyclic, i.e., for all n ≥ 0, EF has no subset of the
form {(X0, X1), (X1, X2), . . . , (Xn−1, Xn), (Xn, X0)}. The graph of a causal team T ,
denoted as GT , is the associated graph of its function component. We call T
recursive if GT is acyclic. Throughout this paper, for simplicity we assume
that all causal teams that we consider are recursive.
Intuitively, a causal team T may be seen as representing an assumption
concerning the causal relationships among the variables in Dom (as encoded
in F ) together with a range of hypotheses concerning the actual state of the
system (as encoded in T−). We now illustrate this idea in the following example.
Example 2.2 The following diagram illustrates a causal team T = (T−,F ).
T−:
U X Y Z
0 0 1 2
1 1 2 6

FX(U) = U
FY (X) = X + 1
FZ(X,Y,U) = 2 ∗ Y + X + U
The table on the left represents a team T− consisting of two assignments, each
of which is tabulated in the obvious way as a row in the table. For instance, the
assignment s of the first row is defined as s(U) = s(X) = 0, s(Y) = 1 and s(Z) = 2.
The arrows in the upper part of the table represent the graph GT of the causal
team T . For instance, the arrow from U to Z represents the edge (U,Z) in GT .
The graph contains no cycles, thus the causal team T is recursive. The variable
U with no incoming arrows is an exogenous variable. The other variables are
endogenous variables, namely, En(F ) = {X,Y,Z}. The function component is
determined by the system of functions on the right of the above diagram. Each
equation defines the “law” that generates the values of an endogenous variable.
5 We identify the set PAFV with a sequence, in a fixed lexicographical ordering.
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Let S = (S −,F ) and T = (T−,G) be causal teams over the same signature.
We call S a causal subteam of T , denoted as S ⊆ T , if S − ⊆ T− and F = G.
An equation X = x is said to be inconsistent if it contains two conjuncts
X = x and X = x′ with distinct values x, x′; otherwise it is said to be consistent.
Definition 2.3 (Intervention) Let T = (T−,F ) be a causal team over some
signature σ = (Dom,Ran). Let X = x (= X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn = xn) be a consistent
equation over σ. The intervention do(X = x) on T is the procedure that
generates a new causal team TX=x = (T−X=x,FX=x) over σ defined as follows:
• FX=x is the restriction of F to En(F ) \ X,
• T−X=x = {sX=x | s ∈ T−}, where each sX=x is an assignment compatible withFX=x defined (recursively) as
sX=x(V) =

xi if V = Xi,
s(V) if V < En(T ) ∪ X,
FV (sX=x(PAFV )) if V ∈ En(T ) \ X
Example 2.4 Recall the recursive causal team T in Example 2.2. By applying
the intervention do(X = 1) to T , we obtain a new causal team TX=1 = (T−X=1,FX=1)
as follows. The function component FX=1 is determined by the equations:{
(FX=1)Y (X) = X + 1
(FX=1)Z(X,Y) = 2 ∗ Y + X + U
The endogenous variable X of the original team T becomes exogenous in the
new team TX=1, and the equation FX(U) = U for X is now removed. The new
team component T−X=1 is obtained by the rewriting procedure illustrated below:
U X Y Z
0 1 ... ...
1 1 ... ...
 
U X Y Z
0 1 2 ...
1 1 2 ...
 
U X Y Z
0 1 2 5
1 1 2 6
In the first step, rewrite the X-column with value 1. Then, update (recursively)
the other columns using the functions from FX=1. In this step, only the columns
that correspond to “descendants” of X will be modified, and the order in which
these columns should be updated is completely determined by the (acyclic) graph
GTX=1 of TX=1. Since the variable X becomes exogenous after the intervention, all
arrows pointing to X have to be removed, e.g., the arrow from U to X. We refer
the reader to [2] for more details and justification for this rewriting procedure.
Definition 2.5 Let ϕ be a formula of the language CO\\/[σ] or COD[σ], and
T = (T−,F ) a causal team over σ. We define the satisfaction relation T |=c ϕ
(or simply T |= ϕ) over causal teams inductively as follows:
• T |= X = x ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ T−, s(X) = x. 6
• T |= =(X;Y) ⇐⇒ for all s, s′ ∈ T−, s(X) = s′(X) implies s(Y) = s′(Y).
6 Note once more that the symbol x is used as both a syntactical and a semantical object.
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• T |= ¬α ⇐⇒ for all s ∈ T−, ({s},F ) 6|= α.
• T |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ T |= ϕ and T |= ψ.
• T |= ϕ∨ψ ⇐⇒ there are two causal subteams T1,T2 of T such that T−1 ∪T−2 =
T−, T1 |= ϕ and T2 |= ψ.
• T |= ϕ \\/ψ ⇐⇒ T |= ϕ or T |= ψ.
• T |= X = x ϕ ⇐⇒ X = x is inconsistent or TX=x |= ϕ.
We write a dependence atom =(; X) with an empty first component as =(X).
The semantic clause for =(X) reduces to:
• T |= =(X) iff for all s, s′ ∈ T−, s(X) = s′(X).
Intuitively, the atom =(X) states that X has a constant value in the team. It is
easy to verify that dependence atoms are definable in CO\\/[σ]:
=(Y) ≡ \\/
y∈Ran(Y)
Y = y and =(X;Y) ≡
∨
x∈Ran(X)
(X = x∧ =(Y)). (1)
It is easy to verify that the selective implication α ⊃ ϕ := ¬α ∨ ϕ, introduced
originally in [1], has the same semantic clause as that in [1]:
• T |= α ⊃ ϕ ⇐⇒ Tα |= ϕ, where Tα is the (unique) causal subteam of T with
team component {s ∈ T− | {s} |= α}.
Example 2.6 Consider the causal team T and the intervention do(X = 1) from
Examples 2.2 and 2.4. Clearly, TX=1 |= Y = 2, and thus T |= X = 1  Y = 2.
We also have that T |== (Y;Z), while TX=1 6|== (Y;Z) (contingent dependencies
are not in general preserved by interventions). Observe that T |= Y , 2∨ Y = 2,
while T 6|= Y , 2 \\/Y = 2.
2.3 Generalized causal teams
We introduce here a more general semantics, which will be needed as a tool
towards the completeness results for CO\\/ and COD.
Given a signature σ, write
Semσ := {(s,F ) ∈ Aσ × Fσ | s is compatible with F }.
The pairs (s,F ) ∈ Semσ can be easily identified with the deterministic causal
models (also known as deterministic structural equation models) that are con-
sidered in the literature on causal inference ([14],[13], etc.). One can informally
identify a causal team T = (T−,F ) with the set
T g = {(s,F ) ∈ Semσ | s ∈ T−}
of deterministic causal models with a uniform function component F through-
out the team. In this section, we introduce a more general notion of causal
team, called generalized causal team, where the function component F does
not have to be constant thoroughout the team.
Definition 2.7 A generalized causal team T over a signature σ is a set of
pairs (s,F ) ∈ Semσ, that is, T ⊆ Semσ.
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Intuitively, a generalized causal team encodes uncertainty about which causal
model governs the variables in Dom - i.e., uncertainty both on the values of the
variables and on the laws that determine them. Our interest in such models
here is purely technical, but probabilistic variants of them have been used e.g.
to define formal notions of blame ([4,9,10]).
Distinct elements (s,F ), (t,G) of the same generalized causal team may also
disagree on what is the set of endogenous variables, or on whether the system
is recursive or not. A generalized causal team is said to be recursive if, for
each pair (s,F ) in the team, the associated graph GF is recursive. In this paper
we only consider recursive generalized causal teams.
For any generalized causal team T , define the team component of T to be
the set T− := {s | (s,F ) ∈ T for some F }. A causal subteam of T is a subset
S of T , denoted as S ⊆ T . The union S ∪ T of two generalized causal teams
S ,T is their set-theoretic union.
A causal team T can be identified with the generalized causal team T g,
which has a constant function component in all its elements. Conversely, if
T is a nonempty generalized causal team in which all elements have the same
function component F , i.e., T = {(s,F ) | s ∈ T−}, we can naturally identify T
with the causal team
T c = (T−,F ).
In particular, a singleton generalized causal team {(s,F )} corresponds to a
singleton causal team ({s},F ). Applying a (consistent) intervention do(X = x)
on ({s},F ) generates a causal team ({sX=x},FX=x) as defined in Definition 2.3.
We can then define the result of the intervention do(X = x) on {(s,F )} to be
the generalized causal team ({sX=x},FX=x)g = {(sX=x,FX=x)}. Interventions on
arbitrary generalized causal teams are defined as follows.
Definition 2.8 (Intervention over generalized causal teams) Let T be
a (recursive) generalized causal team, and X = x a consistent equation over
σ. The intervention do(X = x) on T generates the generalized causal team
TX=x := {(sX=x,FX=x) | (s,F ) ∈ T }.
Definition 2.9 Let ϕ be a formula of the language CO\\/[σ] or COD[σ], and T
a generalized causal team over σ. The satisfaction relation T |=g ϕ (or simply
T |= ϕ) over generalized causal teams is defined in the same way as in Definition
2.5, except for slight differences in the following clauses:
• T |=g ¬α iff for all (s,F ) ∈ T , {(s,F )} 6|= α.
• T |=g ϕ∨ψ iff there are two generalized causal subteams T1,T2 of T such
that T1 ∪ T2 = T , T1 |= ϕ and T2 |= ψ.
Example 2.10 Consider two function components F ,G over the domain
Dom = {X,Y,Z} with Z the only endogenous variable, and FZ(X) = 2 ∗ X
and GZ(X,Y) = X + Y. Clearly, F , G as, e.g., the graph of G con-
tains an additional arrow from X to Z. Consider the generalized causal team
T = {(s,F ), (s,G), (t,G)}, represented in the following left table:
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T :
X Y Z
2 2 4 F
2 2 4 G
1 3 4 G
TY=1 :
X Y Z
2 1 4 FY=1
2 1 3 GY=1
1 1 2 GY=1
Since both F and G are recursive, T is recursive. An intervention do(Y = 1)
on T updates each row in the above left table according to its own associated
function component, returning the right table. Since Y is exogenous both in F
and G, we have FY=1 = F and GY=1 = G. The value of Z in the first row of the
above updated table remains unchanged, because Y is not an argument of FZ.
We list some closure properties for our logics over both causal teams and
generalized causal teams in the next theorem, whose proof is left to the reader,
or see [2] for the causal team case.
Theorem 2.11 Let T, S be (generalized) causal teams over some signature σ.
Empty team property: If T− = ∅, then T |= ϕ.
Downward closure: If T |= ϕ and S ⊆ T , then S |= ϕ.
Flatness of CO-formulas: If α is a CO[σ]-formula, then
T |= α ⇐⇒ ({s},F ) |=c α for all s ∈ T− (resp. {(s,F )} |=g α for all (s,F ) ∈ T ).
The team semantics over causal teams and that over generalized causal
teams with a constant function component are essentially equivalent, in the
sense of the next lemma, whose proof is left to the reader.
Lemma 2.12 (i) For any causal team T , we have that T |=c ϕ ⇐⇒ T g |=g ϕ.
(ii) For any nonempty generalized causal team T with a unique function com-
ponent, we have that T |=g ϕ ⇐⇒ T c |=c ϕ.
Corollary 2.13 For any set ∆ ∪ {α} of CO[σ]-formulas, ∆ |=g α iff ∆ |=c α.
Proof. By Lemma 2.12, {(s,F )} |=g β iff ({s},F ) |=c β for any β ∈ ∆∪ {α}. Thus,
the claim follows from the flatness of CO[σ]-formulas. 2
3 Characterizing function components
3.1 Equivalence of function components
Various notions of similarity among causal models have been considered in the
literature (see e.g. [6]), which measure the “distance” between two models in
terms of their empirical or counterfactual consequences. We consider here a
stricter notion of equivalence, which, as we will see in theorem 3.4, characterizes
indistinguishability of causal structures by means of our languages.
Consider a binary function f and an (n+2)-ary function g defined as f (X,Y) =
X + Y and g(X,Y,Z1, . . . ,Zn) = X + Y. Essentially f and g are the same function:
Z1, . . . ,Zn are dummy arguments of g. We now characterize this idea in the
notion of two function components being equivalent up to dummy arguments.
Definition 3.1 Let F ,G be two function components over σ = (Dom,Ran).
• Let V ∈ Dom. Two functions FV and GV are said to be equivalent up to
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dummy arguments, denoted as FV ∼ GV , if for any x ∈ Ran(PAFV ∩ PAGV ), y ∈
Ran(PAFV \PAGV ) and z ∈ Ran(PAGV \PAFV ), we have that FV (xy) = GV (xz) (where
we assume w.l.o.g. the shown orderings of the arguments of the functions).
• Let Cn(F ) denote the set of endogenous variables V of F for which FV is a
constant function, i.e., for some fixed c ∈ Ran(V), FV (p) = c for all p ∈ PAFV .
We say that F and G are equivalent up to dummy arguments, denoted
as F ∼ G, if En(F ) \ Cn(F ) = En(G) \ Cn(G), and FV ∼ GV holds for all
V ∈ En(F ) \ Cn(F ).
It is easy to see that ∼ is an equivalence relation. The next lemma shows
that the relation ∼ is preserved under interventions.
Lemma 3.2 For any function components F ,G ∈ Fσ and consistent equation
X = x over σ, we have that F ∼ G implies FX=x ∼ GX=x.
Proof. Suppose F ∼ G. Then En(F ) \ Cn(F ) = En(G) \ Cn(G). Observe that
En(FX=x) = En(F ) \X and Cn(FX=x) = Cn(F ) \X; and similarly for G. It follows
that En(FX=x)\Cn(FX=x) = (En(F )\Cn(F ))\X = (En(G)\Cn(G))\X = En(GX=x)\
Cn(GX=x). On the other hand, for any V ∈ En(FX=x)\Cn(FX=x) = (En(F )\Cn(F ))\
X, by the assumption, (FX=x)V = FV ∼ GV = (GX=x)V . 2
We now generalize the equivalence relation ∼ to the team level. Let us first
consider causal teams. Two causal teams T = (T−,F ) and S = (S −,G) of the
same signature σ are said to be similar, denoted as T ∼ S , if F ∼ G. We say
that T and S are equivalent, denoted as T ≈ S , if T ∼ S and T− = S −.
Next, we turn to generalized causal teams. We call a generalized causal
team T a uniform team if F ∼ G for all (s,F ), (t,G) ∈ T . By Lemma 3.2, we
know that if T is uniform, so is TX=x, for any consistent equation X = x. For
any generalized causal team T with (t,F ) ∈ T , write TF := {(s,G) ∈ T | G ∼ F }.
Two generalized causal teams S and T are said to be equivalent, denoted as
S ≈ T , if (S F )− = (TF )− for all F ∈ Fσ.
Theorem 3.3 (Closure under causal equivalence) Let T, S be two (gen-
eralized) causal teams over σ such that T ≈ S . We have that T |= ϕ ⇐⇒ S |= ϕ.
Proof. The theorem is proved by induction on ϕ. The case ϕ = X = x  ψ
follows from the fact that TX=x ≈ SX=x (Lemma 3.2). The case ϕ = ψ ∨ χ
for causal teams follows directly from the induction hypothesis. We now give
the proof for this case for generalized causal teams. We only prove the left to
right direction (the other direction is symmetric). Suppose T |=g ψ ∨ χ. Then
there are T0,T1 ⊆ T such that T = T0 ∪ T1, T0 |=g ψ and T1 |=g χ. Consider
S i = {(s,F ) ∈ S | {(s,F )} ≈ {(s,G)} for some (s,G) ∈ Ti} (i = 0, 1). It is easy to
see that S i ≈ Ti (i = 0, 1) and S = S 0 ∪ S 1. By induction hypothesis we have
that S 0 |=g ψ and S 1 |=g χ. Hence S |=g ψ ∨ χ. 2
Thus, none of our languages can tell apart causal teams which are equivalent
up to dummy arguments. However, one might not be sure, a priori, that a
given argument behaves as dummy for a specific function, as this might e.g. be
unfeasible to verify if the variables range over large sets. For this reason, we
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are keeping this distinction in the semantics instead of quotienting it out.
3.2 Characterizing function components
For any function component F over some signature σ, define a CO[σ]-formula
ΦF :=
∧
V∈En(F )
ησ(V) ∧
∧
V∈(Dom\En(F ))∪Cn(F )
ξσ(V).
where ησ(V) :=
∧{
(W = w ∧ PAFV = p) V = FV (p)
|W = Dom \ (PAFV ∪ {V}), w ∈ Ran(W), p ∈ Ran(PAFV )
}
and ξσ(V) :=
∧{
V = v ⊃ (WV = w V = v)
| v ∈ Ran(V),WV = Dom \ {V},w ∈ Ran(WV )}.
Intuitively, for each non-constant endogenous variable V of F , the formula ησ(V)
specifies that all assignments in the (generalized) causal team T in question
behave exactly as required by the function FV . For each variable V which,
according to F , is exogenous or generated by a constant function, the formula
ξσ(V) states that V is not affected by interventions on other variables. If V ∈
Cn(F ), then V has both an ησ and a ξσ clause. Overall, the formula ΦF
is satisfied in a team T if and only if every assignment in T has a function
component that is ∼-equivalent to F : this nontrivial fact is proved in the next
theorem. This result is the crucial element for adapting the standard methods
of team semantics to the causal context.
Theorem 3.4 Let σ be a signature, and F ∈ Fσ.
(i) For any generalized causal team T over σ, we have that
T |=g ΦF ⇐⇒ for all (s,G) ∈ T : G ∼ F .
(ii) For any nonempty causal team T = (T−,G) over σ, we have that
T |=c ΦF ⇐⇒ G ∼ F .
Proof. (i). =⇒: Suppose T |=g ΦF and (s,G) ∈ T . We show G ∼ F . En(F ) \
Cn(F ) ⊆ En(G) \ Cn(G): For any V ∈ En(F ) \ Cn(F ), there are distinct p,p′ ∈
Ran(PAFV ) such that FV (p) , FV (p′). Since T |= ησ(V), for any w ∈ Ran(W), we
have that
{(s,G)} |= (W = w ∧ PAFV = p) V = FV (p),
{(s,G)} |= (W = w ∧ PAFV = p′) V = FV (p′).
Thus, sW=w∧PAFV =p(V) = FV (p) , FV (p′) = sW=w∧PAFV =p′ (V). So, V < Cn(G), and
furthermore V is not exogenous (since the value of an exogenous variable is not
affected by interventions on different variables). Thus, V ∈ En(G) \ Cn(G).
En(G)\Cn(G) ⊆ En(F )\Cn(F ): For any V ∈ En(G)\Cn(G), there are distinct
p,p′ ∈ Ran(PAGV ) such that GV (p) , GV (p′). Now, if V < En(F ) \ Cn(F ), then
T |= ξσ(V). Let v = s(V) and Z = WV \ PAGV . Since {(s,G)} |= V = v and V < PAGV ,
for any z ∈ Ran(Z), we have that
{(s,G)} |= (Z = z ∧ PAGV = p) V = v,
{(s,G)} |= (Z = z ∧ PAGV = p′) V = v.
By the definition of intervention, we must have that v = sZ=z∧PAGV=p(V) = GV (p) ,
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GV (p′) = sZ=z∧PAGV=p′ (V) = v, which is impossible. Hence, V ∈ En(F ) \ Cn(F ).
FV ∼ GV for any V ∈ En(F ) \ Cn(F ): For any x ∈ Ran(PAFV ∩ PAGV ), y ∈
Ran(PAFV \ PAGV ) and z ∈ Ran(PAGV \ PAFV ), since T |= ησ(V) and V < PAGV , for any
w ∈ Ran(W) with w  (PAGV \ PAFV ) = z, we have that
{(s,G)} |= (W = w ∧ PAFV = xy) V = FV (xy).
Then FV (xy) = sW=w∧PAFV =xy(V) = GV (sW=w∧PAFV =xy(PA
G
V )) = GV (xz), as required.
⇐=: Suppose that G ∼ F for all (s,G) ∈ T . Since the formula ΦF is flat, it
suffices to show that {(s,G)} |= ησ(V) for all V ∈ En(F ), and {(s,G)} |= ξσ(V) for
all V ∈ (Dom \ En(F )) ∪ Cn(F ).
For the former, take any w ∈ Ran(W) and p ∈ Ran(PAFV ), and let Z = z
abbreviate W = w ∧ PAFV = p. We show that {(sZ=z,GZ=z)} |= V = FV (p). SinceG ∼ F , by Lemma 3.2 we have that GZ=z ∼ FZ=z. Thus,
sZ=z(V) = (GZ=z)V (sZ=z(PAGZ=zV )) = (FZ=z)V (sZ=z(PAFZ=zV )) (since GX=x ∼ FX=x)
= FV (sZ=z(PAFV )) (since V < Z)
= FV (p).
For the latter, take any v ∈ Ran(V) and w ∈ Ran(WV ). Assume that {(s,G)} |=
V = v, i.e., s(V) = v. Since V < En(F ) \ Cn(F ) and F ∼ G, we know that
V < En(G) or V ∈ Cn(G). In both cases we have that {(s,G)} |= WV = w V = v.
(ii). Let T be a nonempty causal team. Consider its associated generalized
causal team T g. The claim then follows from Lemma 2.12 and item (i). 2
Corollary 3.5 For any generalized causal team T over some signature σ,
T |= \\/
F ∈Fσ
ΦF ⇐⇒ T is uniform.
The intuituionistic disjunction \\/ was shown to have the disjunction prop-
erty, i.e., |= ϕ \\/ψ implies |= ϕ or |= ψ, in propositional inquisitive logic ([5]) and
propositional dependence logic ([17]). It follows immediately from Theorem 3.4
that the disjunction property of \\/ fails in the context of causal teams, because
|=c \\/F ∈Fσ ΦF , whereas 6|=c ΦF for any F ∈ Fσ. Nevertheless, the intuitionistic
disjunction does admit the disjunction property over generalized causal teams.
Theorem 3.6 (Disjunction property) Let ∆ be a set of CO[σ]-formulas,
and ϕ, ψ be arbitrary formulas over σ. If ∆ |=g ϕ \\/ψ, then ∆ |=g ϕ or ∆ |=g ψ.
In particular, if |=g ϕ \\/ψ, then |=g ϕ or |=g ψ.
Proof. Suppose ∆ 6|=g ϕ and ∆ 6|=g ψ. Then there are two generalized causal
teams T1,T2 such that T1 |= ∆, T2 |= ∆, T1 6|= ϕ and T2 6|= ψ. Let T := T1 ∪T2. By
flatness of ∆, we have that T |= ∆. On the other hand, by downwards closure,
we have that T 6|= ϕ and T 6|= ψ, and thus T 6|= ϕ \\/ψ. 2
4 Characterizing CO
In this section, we characterize the expressive power of CO over causal teams
and present a system of natural deduction for CO that is sound and complete
over both causal teams and generalized causal teams.
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4.1 Expressivity
In this subsection, we show that CO-formulas capture the flat class of causal
teams (up to ≈-equivalence). Our result is analogous to known characteriza-
tions of flat languages in propositional team semantics ([18]), with a twist,
given by the fact that only the unions of similar causal teams are reasonably
defined. We define such unions as follows.
Definition 4.1 Let S = (S −,F ),T = (T−,G) be two causal teams over the same
signature σ with S ∼ T . The union of S and T is defined as the causal team
S ∪ T = (S − ∪ T−,H) over σ, where
• En(H) = (En(F ) \ Cn(F)) ∩ (En(G) \ Cn(G)),
• and for each V ∈ En(H), PAHV = PAFV ∩ PAGV , and HV (p) = FV (px) for any
p ∈ PAFV ∩ PAGV and x ∈ PAFV \ PAGV .
Clearly, H ∼ F ∼ G and thus S ∪ T ∼ S ∼ T .
A formula ϕ over σ determines a class Kϕ of causal teams defined as
Kϕ = {T | T |= ϕ}.
We say that a formula ϕ defines a class K of causal teams if K = Kϕ.
Definition 4.2 We say that a class K of causal teams over σ is
• causally downward closed if T ∈ K and S ⊆ T imply S ∈ K ;
• closed under causal unions if, whenever T1,T2 ∈ K and T1∪T2 is defined,
T1 ∪ T2 ∈ K ;
• flat if (T−,F ) ∈ K iff ({s},F ) ∈ K for all s ∈ T−;
• closed under equivalence if T ∈ K and T ≈ T ′ imply T ′ ∈ K .
It is easy to verify that K is flat iff K is causally downward closed and closed
under causal unions. Any nonempty downward closed class K of causal teams
over σ contains all causal teams over σ with empty team component. The class
Kϕ is always nonempty as the teams with empty team component are always
in Kϕ (by Theorem 2.11). By Theorems 2.11 and 3.3, if α is a CO-formula,
then Kα is flat and closed under equivalence. The main result of this section is
the following characterization theorem which gives also the converse direction.
Theorem 4.3 Let K be a nonempty (finite) class of causal teams over some
signature σ. Then K is definable by a CO[σ]-formula if and only if K is flat
and closed under equivalence.
In order to prove the above theorem, we introduce a CO-formula ΘT , inspired
by a similar one in [17], that defines the property “having as team component
a subset of T−”. For each causal team T over σ = (Dom,Ran), define
ΘT :=
∨
s∈T−
∧
V∈Dom
V = s(V).
Lemma 4.4 S |= ΘT iff S − ⊆ T−, for any causal teams S ,T over σ.
Proof. “=⇒”: Suppose S |= ΘT and S = (S −,F ). For any s ∈ S −, by downward
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closure, we have that ({s},F ) |= ΘT , which means that for some t ∈ T−, ({s},F ) |=
V = t(V) for all V ∈ Dom. Since {s} and {t} have the same signature, this implies
that s = t, thereby s ∈ T−.
“⇐=”: Suppose S − ⊆ T−. Observe that S |= ΘS and ΘT = ΘS ∨ΘT\S . Thus,
we conclude S |= ΘT by the empty team property. 2
Lemma 4.5 Let S = (S −,G) and T = (T−,F ) be causal teams over σ with
S −,T− , ∅. Then S |= ΘT ∧ ΦF ⇐⇒ S ≈ R ⊆ T for some R over σ.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 3.4, we have that S |= ΘT ∧ΦF iff S − ⊆ T−
and G ∼ F . It then suffices to show that the latter is equivalent to S ≈ R ⊆ T
for some R. The right to left direction is clear; conversely, if S − ⊆ T− and
G ∼ F , then we can take R = (S −,F ). 2
Consider the quotient set Fσ/≈. For each equivalence class [F ] ∈ Fσ/≈ choose
a unique representative F0. Denote by F0σ the set of all such representatives.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. It suffices to prove the direction “⇐=”. For each
F ∈ F0σ, let KF := {(T−,G) ∈ K | G ∼ F }. Clearly K =
⋃
F ∈F0σ KF . Let
TF =
⋃KF , which is well-defined as in Definition 4.1. Since K is closed under
causal unions, TF ∈ K . We may assume w.l.o.g. that TF = (T−F ,F ). Let
ϕ =
∨
F ∈F0σ
(ΘTF ∧ ΦF ).
It suffices to show that Kϕ = K . For any S = (S −,G) ∈ K , there exists
F ∈ F0σ such that S ∈ KF . Let R = (S −,F ). Clearly, S ≈ R ⊆
⋃KF = TF ,
which by Lemma 4.5 implies that S |= ΘTF ∧ΦF . Hence, S |= ϕ, namely S ∈ Kϕ.
Conversely, suppose S = (S −,G) ∈ Kϕ, i.e., S |= ϕ. Then for every F ∈ F0σ,
there is S F ⊆ S such that S = ⋃F ∈F0σ S F and S F |= ΘTF ∧ΦF . Thus, by Lemma
4.5, we obtain that S F ≈ RF ⊆ TF for some RF . In particular, we have that
S F = (S −F ,G) ∼ (T−F ,F ) = TF , which gives G ∼ F . But since no two distinct
elements in F0σ are ∼-similar to each other, and S F ∼ S for each F ∈ F0σ, this
can only happen if S −F = ∅ for all F ∈ F0σ except one. Denote this unique
element of F0σ by H . Now, S = SH ≈ RH ⊆ TF ∈ K . Hence we conclude that
S ∈ K , as K is causally closed downward and closed under equivalence. 
4.2 Deduction system
The logic CO[σ] over (recursive) causal teams was given in [2] a sound and
complete axiomatization which incorporated ideas from [7], [8], [3] and [9]. In
this section, we present an equivalent system of natural deduction and show it
to be sound and complete also over (recursive) generalized causal teams.
Definition 4.6 The system of natural deduction for CO[σ] consists of the fol-
lowing rules:
• (Parameterized) rules for value range assumptions:
ValDef∨
x∈Ran(X) X = x
X = x ValUnq
X , x′
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• Rules for ∧,∨,¬:
ϕ ψ ∧I
ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧Eϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧E
ψ
ϕ ∨I
ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ∨I
ψ ∨ ϕ ϕ ∨ ψ
[ϕ]
...
α
[ψ]
...
α ∨Eα
[α]
...
⊥ ¬I¬α
α ¬α ¬Eϕ
[¬α]
...
⊥
RAAα
• Rules for :
Eff(X = x ∧ Y = y) Y = y X = x W = w X = x γ Cmp(1)(X = x ∧W = w) γ
X = x ⊥⊥Eϕ ⊥E(2)(Y = y ∧ X = x ∧ X = x′) ϕ
X = x ϕ
[X = x]
...
Y = y
[Y = y]
...
X = x
SubAY = y ϕ
X = x ϕ
[ϕ]
...
ψ
SubCX = x ψ
X = x ϕ X = x ψ
∧IX = x ϕ ∧ ψ
X = x ϕ ∨ ψ
∨Dst
(X = x ϕ) ∨ (X = x ψ)
X = x (Y = y ϕ)
Extr (3)
(X′ = x′ ∧ Y = y) ϕ
(X = x ∧ Y = y) ϕ
Exp (4)X = x (Y = y ϕ)
¬(X = x α) ¬EX = x ¬α
X1 { X2 . . . . . . Xk−1 { Xk Recur (5)¬(Xk { X1)
(1) γ is -free. (2) x , x′. (3) X = x is consistent, X′ = X \ Y, x′ = x \ y. (4) X ∩ Y = ∅.
(5) Xi , X j (i , j), and X { Y (meaning “X causally affects Y”) is defined as:
X { Y :=
∨{
Z = z
(
(X = x Y = y) ∧ (X = x′ Y = y′))
| Z ⊆ Dom \ {X,Y}, z ∈ Ran(Z), x, x′ ∈ Ran(X), y, y′ ∈ Ran(Y), x , x′, y , y′
}
.
Note that the above system is parametrized with the signature σ, and the
rules with double horizontal lines are invertible. We write Γ `σ ϕ (or simply
Γ ` ϕ when σ is clear from the context) if the formula ϕ can be derived from Γ
by applying the rules in the above system. It is easy to verify that all rules in
our system are sound for recursive (generalized) causal teams. The axioms and
rules in the Hilbert system of [2] are either included or derivable in our natural
deduction system, as shown in the next proposition. We refer the reader to [2]
for a commentary on the rules for  and a discussion of the soundness of the
rule ∨Dst (i.e. the Distribution rule typical of Stalnaker’s counterfactuals).
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Proposition 4.7 The following are derivable in the system for CO[σ]:
(i) α,¬α ∨ ϕ ` ϕ (weak modus ponens)
(ii) X = x Y = y ` X = x Y , y′ (Uniqueness)
(iii) X = x ϕ ∧ ψ ` X = x ϕ (Extraction)
(iv) ¬(X = x α) a` X = x ¬α
(v)
∨
y∈Ran(Y)(X = x Y = y) (Definiteness)
Proof. Item (i) follows from ¬E and ∨E. Items (ii),(iii) follow from ValUnq,
∧E and SubC. For item (iv), the left to right direction follows from ¬E.
For the other direction, we first derive by applying ∧I, and ⊥E that
X = x ¬α,X = x α ` X = x ¬α ∧ α ` X = x ⊥ ` ⊥
Then, by ¬I we conclude that X = x ¬α ` ¬(X = x α).
For item (v), we first derive by Eff that ` X = x X = x, where X = x is
an arbitrary equation from X = x. By ValDef we also have that ` ∨y∈Ran(Y) Y = y.
Thus, we conclude by applying SubC that ` X = x ∨y∈Ran(Y) Y = y, which
then implies that ` ∨y∈Ran(Y)(X = x Y = y) by ∨Dst. 2
Theorem 4.8 (Completeness) Let ∆∪{α} be a set of CO[σ]-formulas. Then
∆ ` α ⇐⇒ ∆ |=c/g α.
Proof. Since our system derives all axioms and rules of the Hilbert system of
[2], the completeness of our system over causal teams follows from that of [2].
The completeness of the system over generalized causal teams follows from the
fact that ∆ |=c α iff ∆ |=g α, given by Corollary 2.13. 2
5 Extensions of CO
5.1 Expressive power of CO\\/ and COD
In this section, we characterize the expressive power of CO\\/ and COD over
causal teams. We show that both logics characterize all nonempty causally
downward closed team properties up to causal equivalence, and the two log-
ics are thus expressively equivalent. An analogous result can be obtained for
generalized causal teams, but we omit it due to space limitations.
Theorem 5.1 Let K be a nonempty (finite) class of causal teams over some
signature σ. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) K is causally downward closed and closed under equivalence.
(ii) K is definable by a CO\\/[σ]-formula.
(iii) K is definable by a COD[σ]-formula.
By Theorems 2.11 and 3.3, for every CO\\/[σ]- or COD[σ]-formula ϕ, the set
Kϕ is nonempty, causally downward closed and closed under causal equivalence.
Thus items (ii) and (iii) of the above theorem imply item (i). Since dependence
atoms =(X;Y) are definable in CO\\/[σ] (see Equation (1)), item (iii) implies item
(ii). It then suffices to show that item (i) implies item (iii). In this proof, we
make essential use of a formula ΞT that resembles, in the causal setting, a
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similar formula introduced in [17] in the pure team setting.
Given any causal team T = (T−,G) over σ, let T = (Aσ \ T−,G) and G0 ∈ F0σ
be such that [G0] = [G]. If T− , ∅ and |T−| = k + 1, define a COD[σ]-formula
ΞT := (χk ∨ ΘT ) ∨
∨
F ∈F0σ\{G0}
ΦF ,
where the formula χk is defined inductively as
χ0 = ⊥, χ1 =
∧
V∈Dom
=(V), and χk = χ1 ∨ · · ·︸︷︷︸
k times
∨χ1 (k > 1).
Lemma 5.2 Let S ,T be two causal teams over some signature σ with T− , ∅.
Then, S |= ΞT ⇐⇒ for all R : T ≈ R implies R * S .
Proof. First, observe that the formula χk characterize the cardinality of causal
teams S , in the sense that
S |= χk iff |S −| ≤ k. (2)
Indeed, clearly, S |= χ0 iff S − = ∅, S |= χ1 iff |S −| ≤ 1, and for k > 1, S |= χk iff
S = S 1 ∪ · · · ∪ S k with each S i |= χ1 iff |S −| ≤ k.
Now we prove the lemma. Let S = (S −,H). “=⇒”: Suppose S |= ΞT . If
H 6∼ G, then T = (T−,G) ≈ (T−,G′) = R implies G′ , H , thereby R * S . Now,
suppose H ∼ G ∼ G0. If S − = ∅, then since T− , ∅, the statement holds.
If S − , ∅, then by Lemma 3.4(ii), we know that no nonempty subteam of S
satisfies
∨
F ∈F0σ\{G0}Φ
F . Thus there exist S 1, S 2 ⊆ S such that S −1 ∪ S −2 = S −,
S 1 |= χk and S 2 |= ΘT . (3)
By (2), the first clause of the above implies that |S −1 | ≤ k. Since |T−| = k+1 > k,
this means that T− \S −1 , ∅. By Lemma 4.5, it follows from the second clause of
(3) and the fact that S 2 |= ΦG (given again by Lemma 3.4(ii)) that S 2 ≈ R0 ⊆ T
for some R0. Thus, T− ∩ S −2 = ∅. Altogether, we conclude that T− * S −. Thus,
for any R such that R ≈ T , we must have that R− = T− * S −, thereby R * S .
“⇐=”: Suppose T ≈ R implies R 6⊆ S for all R. If H 6∼ G ∼ G0, then by
Lemma 3.4(ii) we have that S |= ∨F ∈F0σ\{G0}ΦF , thereby S |= ΞT , as required.
Now, suppose H ∼ G. The assumption then implies that T− * S −. Let S 1 =
(S −∩T−,H) and S 2 = (S −\T−,H). Clearly, S − = S −1 ∪S −2 , and it suffices to show
that (3) holds. By definition we have that S −2 ⊆ (T )−, which implies the second
clause of (3) by Lemma 4.4. To prove the first clause of (3), by (2) it suffices
to verify that |S −1 | ≤ k. Indeed, since T− * S −, we have that T− ) S − ∩T− = S −1 .
Hence, |S −1 | < |T−| = k + 1, namely, |S −1 | ≤ k. 2
Now we are in a position to prove the main theorem of the section.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We prove that item (i) implies item (iii). Let K
be a nonempty finite class of causal teams as described in item (i). Since
K is nonempty and causally downward closed, all causal teams over σ with
empty team component belong to K . Thus, every causal team T ∈ Cσ \ K has
a nonempty team component, where Cσ denotes the (finite) set of all causal
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teams over σ. Now, define ϕ =
∧
T∈Cσ\K
ΞT . We show that K = Kϕ.
For any S < K , i.e., S ∈ Cσ \ K , since S ⊆ S and S − , ∅, by Lemma 5.2
we have that S 6|= ΞS . Thus S 6|= ϕ, i.e., S < Kϕ. Conversely, suppose S ∈ K .
Take any T ∈ Cσ \ K . If T ≈ R ⊆ S for some R, then since K is closed under
equivalence and causally closed downward, we must conclude that T ∈ K , which
is a contradiction. Thus, by Lemma 5.2, S |= ΞT . Hence S |= ϕ, i.e., S ∈ Kϕ. 
5.2 Axiomatizing CO\\/ over generalized causal teams
In this section, we introduce a sound and complete system of natural deduction
for CO\\/[σ], which extends of the system for CO[σ], and can also be seen as a
variant of the systems for propositional dependence logics introduced in [17].
Definition 5.3 The system of natural deduction for CO\\/[σ] consists of all
rules of the system of CO[σ] (see Definition 4.6) together with the following
rules, where note that in the rules ∨E, ¬I, ¬E, RAA and ¬ I from Definition
4.6 the formula α ranges over CO[σ]-formulas only:
• Additional rules for ∨:
ϕ ∨ ψ ∨Com
ψ ∨ ϕ
(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ ∨Ass
ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ) ϕ ∨ ψ
[ϕ]
...
χ ∨Sub
χ ∨ ψ
• Rules for \\/ :
ϕ
\\/I
ϕ \\/ψ
ϕ
\\/I
ψ \\/ϕ ϕ \\/ψ
[ϕ]
...
χ
[ψ]
...
χ
\\/Eχ
ϕ ∨ (ψ \\/ χ) ∨\\/Dst(ϕ ∨ ψ) \\/ (ϕ ∨ χ)
X = x ψ \\/ χ
\\/Dst(X = x ψ) \\/ (X = x χ)
The rules in our system are clearly sound. We now proceed to prove the
completeness theorem. An important lemma for the theorem states that every
CO\\/[σ]-formula ϕ is provably equivalent to the \\/ -disjunction of a (finite) set
of CO[σ]-formulas. Formulas of this type are called resolutions of ϕ in [5].
Definition 5.4 Let ϕ be a CO\\/[σ]-formula. Define the set R(ϕ) of its resolu-
tions inductively as follows:
• R(X = x) = {X = x},
• R(¬α) = {¬α},
• R(ψ ∧ χ) = {α ∧ β | α ∈ R(ψ), β ∈ R(χ)},
• R(ψ ∨ χ) = {α ∨ β | α ∈ R(ψ), β ∈ R(χ)},
• R(ψ \\/ χ) = R(ψ) ∪ R(χ),
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• R(X = x ϕ) = {X = x α | α ∈ R(ϕ)}.
The set R(ϕ) is clearly a finite set of CO[σ]-formulas.
Lemma 5.5 For any formula ϕ ∈ CO\\/[σ], we have that ϕ a` \\/R(ϕ).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on ϕ. If ϕ is X = x or ¬α for some
CO[σ]-formula α, then R(ϕ) = {ϕ}, and ϕ a` \\/R(ϕ) holds trivially.
Now, suppose ψ a` \\/R(ψ) and χ a` \\/R(χ). If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ, observing that
θ0 ∧ (θ1 \\/ θ2) a` (θ0 ∧ θ1) \\/ (θ0 ∧ θ2) (by \\/E, \\/ I,∧I,∧E), we derive by \\/ I, \\/E that
ψ ∧ χ a` ( \\/R(ψ)) ∧ ( \\/R(χ)) a` \\/{α ∧ β | α ∈ R(ψ), β ∈ R(χ)} a` \\/R(ψ ∧ χ).
If ϕ = ψ∨χ, we have analogous derivations using the fact that θ0∨(θ1 \\/ θ2) a`
(θ0 ∨ θ1) \\/ (θ0 ∨ θ2) (by ∨ \\/Dst, \\/ I, \\/E and ∨Sub) and \\/ I, \\/E.
If ϕ = ψ \\/ χ, then by applying \\/ I and \\/E, we have that
ψ \\/ χ a` ( \\/R(ψ)) \\/ ( \\/R(χ)) a` \\/ (R(ψ) ∪ R(χ)) a` \\/R(ψ \\/ χ).
If ϕ = X = x ψ, then
X = x ψ a` X = x \\/R(ψ) (SubC)
a` \\/{X = x α | α ∈ R(ψ)} ( \\/Dst, and \\/ I,SubC , \\/E)
a` \\/R(X = x ψ). ( \\/Dst, and \\/ I,SubC , \\/E)
2
Theorem 5.6 (Completeness) Let Γ∪{ψ} be a set of CO\\/[σ]-formulas. Then
Γ ` ψ ⇐⇒ Γ |=g ψ.
Proof. We prove the “⇐=” direction. Observe that there are only finitely
many classes of causal teams of signature σ. Thus, any set of CO\\/[σ]-formulas
is equivalent to a single CO\\/[σ]-formula, and it then suffices to prove the state-
ment for Γ = {ϕ}.
Now suppose ϕ |= ψ. Then by Lemma 5.5 and soundness we have that
\\/R(ϕ) |= \\/R(ψ). Thus, for every γ ∈ R(ϕ), γ |=g \\/R(ψ), which further implies,
by Lemma 3.6, that there is an αγ ∈ R(ψ) such that γ |= αγ. Since γ, αγ are
CO[σ]-formulas, and the system for CO\\/[σ] extends that for CO[σ], we obtain
by the completeness theorem of CO[σ] (Theorem 4.8) that γ ` αγ. Applying \\/ I
and Lemma 5.5, we obtain γ ` \\/R(ψ) ` ψ for each γ ∈ R(ψ). Thus, by Lemma
5.5 and repeated applications of \\/E, we conclude that ϕ ` \\/R(ϕ) ` ψ. 2
5.3 Axiomatizing CO\\/ over causal teams
The method for the completeness proof of the previous subsection cannot be
used for causal team semantics, as it makes essential use of the disjunction
property of \\/ , which fails over causal teams. However, since causal teams
can be regarded as a special case of generalized causal teams, all the rules in
the system for CO\\/ over generalized causal teams are also sound over causal
teams. We can then axiomatize CO\\/ over causal teams by extending the system
of CO\\/ for generalized causal teams with an axiom characterizing the property
of being uniform, i.e. “indistinguishable” from a causal team.
Definition 5.7 The system for CO\\/[σ] over causal teams consists of all rules
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of CO\\/[σ] over generalized causal teams (Def. 5.3) plus the following axiom:
Unf\\/F ∈Fσ ΦF
By Theorem 3.4(ii), the axiom Unf is clearly sound over causal teams.
Lemma 5.8 For any set Γ∪{ψ} of CO\\/[σ]-formulas, Γ |=c ψ iff Γ, \\/
F ∈Fσ
ΦF |=g ψ.
Proof. ⇐=: Suppose T |=c Γ for some causal team T . Consider the generalized
causal team T g generated by T . By Lemma 2.12, T g |=g Γ. Since T g is uniform,
Corollary 3.5 gives that T g |=g \\/F ∈Fσ ΦF . Then, by assumption, we obtain that
T g |=g ψ, which, by Lemma 2.12 again, implies that T |=c ψ.
=⇒: Suppose T |=g Γ and T |=g \\/F ∈Fσ ΦF for some generalized causal team
T . By Corollary 3.5 we know that T is uniform. Pick (t,F ) ∈ T . Consider the
generalized causal team S = {(s,F ) | s ∈ T−}. Observe that T ≈ S . Thus, by
Theorem 3.3, we have that S |=g Γ, which further implies, by Lemma 2.12(ii),
that S c |=c Γ. Hence, by the assumption we conclude that S c |=c ψ. Finally, by
applying Lemma 2.12(ii) and Theorem 3.3 again, we obtain T |=g ψ. 2
Theorem 5.9 (Completeness) Let Γ∪{ψ} be a set of CO\\/[σ]-formulas. Then
Γ |=c ψ ⇐⇒ Γ `c ψ.
Proof. Suppose Γ |=c ψ. By Lemma 5.8, we have that Γ, \\/F ∈Fσ ΦF |=g ψ, which
implies that Γ, \\/F ∈Fσ ΦF ` ψ, by the completeness theorem (5.6) of the system
for CO\\/[σ] over generalized causal teams. Thus, Γ ` ψ by axiom Unf. 2
5.4 Axiomatizing COD
We briefly sketch the analogous axiomatization results for the language COD
over both semantics.
Over generalized causal teams, the system for COD[σ] consists of all the
rules of the system for CO[σ] (Definition 4.6) together with ∨Com, ∨Ass, ∨Sub
(the “additional rules for ∨” from Definition 5.3) and the new rules for depen-
dence atoms defined below:
X = x DepI0=(X)
[=(X1)] . . . [=(Xn)]
=(Y)
DepI
=(X1, . . . , Xn;Y)
ϕ
∀x ∈ Ran(X)
[ϕ[X = x/ =(X)]]
...
ψ
Dep0E (∗)ψ
=(X1, . . . , Xn;Y) =(X1) . . . =(Xn) DepE
=(Y)
(∗) ϕ[X = x/ =(X)] stands for the formula obtained by replacing a specific occurrence of
=(X) in ϕ with X = x.
20 Counterfactuals and dependencies on causal teams: expressive power and deduction systems
These rules for dependence atoms generalize the corresponding rules in the pure
team setting as introduced in [17]. The completeness theorem of the system can
be proved by generalizing the corresponding arguments in [17]. Analogously
to the case for CO\\/, in this proof we use the fact that every formula ϕ is
(semantically) equivalent to a formula \\/i∈I αi in disjunctive normal form, where
each αi is a CO[σ]-formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every dependence atom
=(X;Y) by a formula
∨
x∈Ran(X)(X = x ∧ Y = y) with y ranging over all of Ran(Y).
The disjunctive formula \\/i∈I αi is not in the language of COD, but we can prove
in the system of COD (by applying the additional rules in the table above) that
αi ` ϕ (i ∈ I), and that
Γ, αi ` ψ for all i ∈ I =⇒ Γ, ϕ ` ψ.
These mean in effect that “ϕ a` \\/i∈I αi”. The completeness theorem for COD
is then proved using essentially the same strategy as that for CO\\/ (Thm. 5.6).
Over causal teams, using the same method as in the previous section, the
complete system for COD[σ] can be defined as an extension of the above gen-
eralized causal team system with two additional axioms 1Fun and NoMix:
1Fun (1)∧
V∈Dom
(
βEn(V) ⊃ (
∧
w∈WV
WV = w=(V))
)
NoMix (2)∧
V∈Dom
∧
{Ξ{a,b}∗ | (a, b) ∈ Sem2σ, {a} |= βEn(V), {b} 6|= βEn(V)}
(1) WV = Dom \ {V}, and βEn(V) := ∨X∈WV βDC(X,V), where each βDC(X,V) is the CO[σ]-
formula from [2] expressing the property “X is a direct cause of V”:
βDC(X,V) :=
∨{
(Z = z ∧ X = x) V = v, (Z = z ∧ X = x′) V = v′
| x, x′ ∈ Ran(X), v, v′ ∈ Ran(V), Z = Dom \ {X,V}, z ∈ Ran(Z), x , x′, v , v′}.
(2) Ξ{a,b}∗ is defined otherwise the same as Ξ{a,b} except that χ1 is redefined as
χ1 :=
∧
V∈Dom
(
=(V) ∧
∧
w∈Ran(WV )
(WV = w=(V))
)
.
The axiom 1Fun states that the endogenous variables are governed by a unique
function; the axiom NoMix guarantees that all members of the generalized
causal team agree on what is the set of endogenous variables. Together, these
two additional axioms characterize the uniformity of the generalized causal
team in question (or they are equivalent to the formula Unf in CO\\/[σ]), thus
allow for a completeness proof along the lines of Section 5.3.
6 Conclusion
We have answered the main questions concerning the expressive power and the
existence of deduction calculi for the languages that were proposed in [1] and
[2], and which involve both (interventionist) counterfactuals and (contingent)
dependencies. In the process, we have introduced a generalized causal team
semantics, for which we have also provided natural deduction calculi. We
point out that our calculi are sound only for recursive systems, i.e., when
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the causal graph is acyclic. The general case (and special cases such as the
“Lewisian” systems considered in [19]) will require a separate study. We point
out, however, that each of our deduction systems can be adapted to the case
of unique-solution (possibly generalized) causal teams by replacing the Recur
rule with an inference rule that expresses the Reversibility axiom from [7].
Our work shows that many methodologies developed in the literature on
team semantics can be adapted to the generalized semantics and, to a lesser
extent, to causal team semantics. On the other hand, a number of peculiarities
emerged that set apart these semantic frameworks from the usual team seman-
tics: for example, the failure of the disjunction property over causal teams. We
believe the present work may provide guidelines for the investigation of further
notions of dependence and causation in causal team semantics and its variants.
References
[1] Barbero, F. and G. Sandu, Team semantics for interventionist counterfactuals and
causal dependence, in: Proceedings CREST@ETAPS 2018, pp. 16–30.
[2] Barbero, F. and G. Sandu, Team semantics for interventionist counterfactuals:
observations vs. interventions, Journal of Philosophical Logic (to appear), 2020.
[3] Briggs, R., Interventionist counterfactuals, Philosophical Studies: An International
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 160 (2012), pp. 139–166.
[4] Chockler, H. and J. Y. Halpern, Responsibility and blame: A structural-model approach,
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 22 (2004): 93-115.
[5] Ciardelli, I., Questions in logic, 2016, PhD thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[6] Eva, B., R. Stern, and S. Hartmann, The similarity of causal structure, Philosophy of
Science 86.5 (2019): 821-835.
[7] Galles, D. and J. Pearl, An axiomatic characterization of causal counterfactuals,
Foundations of Science 3 (1998), pp. 151–182.
[8] Halpern, J. Y., Axiomatizing causal reasoning, J. Artif. Int. Res. 12 (2000), pp. 317–337.
[9] Halpern, J. (2016). Actual Causality, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The
MIT Press.
[10] Halpern, J. Y. and M. Kleiman-Weiner, Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness,
Intention, and Moral Responsibility, Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18), 2018.
[11] Hitchcock, C., The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs, The
Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 273-299.
[12] Hodges, W., Compositional semantics for a language of imperfect information, Logic
Journal of the IGPL 5 (1997), pp. 539–563.
[13] Pearl, J., Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge University Press, New
York, NY, USA, 2000.
[14] Spirtes, P., C. Glymour and R. N. Scheines, Causation, Prediction, and Search, Lecture
Notes in Statistics 81, Springer New York, 1993.
[15] Starr, W., Counterfactuals, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/counterfactuals/.
[16] Va¨a¨na¨nen, J., Dependence Logic: A New Approach to Independence Friendly Logic,
London Mathematical Society Student Texts 70, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[17] Yang, F. and J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Propositional logics of dependence, Annals of Pure and
Applied Logic 167 (2016), pp. 557 – 589.
[18] Yang, F. and J. Va¨a¨na¨nen, Propositional team logics, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
168 (2017), pp. 1406 – 1441.
[19] Zhang, J., A Lewisian logic of causal counterfactuals, Minds and Machines 23 (2013),
pp. 77–93.
